## eBPF and XDP seen from the eyes of a meerkat

#### É. Leblond

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#### Eric Leblond a.k.a Regit

- Network security expert
- Netfilter core team:
  - Maintainer of ulogd2: Netfilter logging daemon
- Suricata developer:
  - In charge of packet acquisition
  - co-founder of Stamus Networks, a company providing Suricata based network probe appliances.



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#### Not a Kernel developer

- 42 + 1 patches in Linux
- Mainly hacks



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## No kernel harmed during the making of this talk



- IDS and IPS engine
- Get it here: http://www.suricata-ids.org
- Open Source (GPLv2)
- Initially publicly funded, now funded by consortium members
- Run by Open Information Security Foundation (OISF)
- More information about OISF at

http://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/





## Suricata key points



eBPF and XDP seen from the eyes of a meerkat

## Suricata Ecosystem



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## Suricata application layer analysis



## Suricata EVE JSON event

"timestamp": "2015-07-15T16:47:47.941448+0200", "flow id": 100815541166104, "pcap\_cnt": 24, "event type": "alert". "src ip": "192.168.0.254". "src port": 36391. "dest ip": "192.168.0.5". "dest port": 25. "proto": "TCP", "alert": { "action": "allowed". "gid": 1, "signature id": 1. "signature": "Mail to stamus", "category": "", "severity": 3 }. "vars" "pktvars": "email": "eleblond@stamus-networks.com" }. "app proto": "smtp", "app\_proto\_tc": "failed", "flow": { "pkts toserver": 12. "pkts toclient": 12, "bytes toserver": 1244. "bytes toclient": 1086. "start": "2015-07-15T16:47:32.778264+0200"



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## Suricata Dashboard





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#### Suricata meets eBPF

#### AF\_PACKET bypass via eBPF





## AF\_PACKET

#### Linux raw socket

- Raw packet capture method
- Socket based or mmap based



## AF\_PACKET

#### Linux raw socket

- Raw packet capture method
- Socket based or mmap based

#### Fanout mode

- Load balancing over multiple sockets
- Multiple load balancing functions
  - Flow based
  - OPU based
  - RSS based



## Suricata workers mode

System					IRQ CPU link
Ethernet Card					
IRQ 0 RX CPU 0	IRQ 1 RX CPU 1	IRQ 2 RX CPU 2	IRQ 3 RX CPU 3	IRQ 4 RX CPU 4	IRQ 5 RX CPU 5
Capture	Capture	Capture	Capture	Capture	Capture
Decode	Decode	Decode	Decode	Decode	Decode
Stream	Stream	Stream	Stream	Stream	Stream
Detect	Detect	Detect	Detect	Detect	Detect
Output	Output	Output	Output	Output	Output
Thread	Thread	Thread	Thread	Thread	Thread
CPU 0	CPU 1	CPU 2 Suri	cata	CPU 4 CPU 5 CPU load-balancing	



## Load balancing and hash symmetry



- Using packets sniffed from network
- to reconstruct TCP stream as seen by remote application

Non symmetrical hash break

Out of order packets

#### Effect of non symmetrical hash



## Broken symmetry

#### History

- T. Herbert introduce asymmetrical hash function in flow
  - Kernel 4.2
- Users did start to complain
- And our quest did begin
- Fixed in 4.6 and pushed to stable by David S. Miller



## Broken symmetry

#### History

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#### Intel NIC RSS hash

- XL510 hash is not symmetrical
- XL710 could be symmetrical
  - Hardware is capable
  - Driver does not allow it
  - Patch proposed by Victor Julien

## eBPF cluster

#### Userspace to the rescue

- Program your own hash function in userspace
- Available since Linux 4.3
- Developed by Willem de Bruijn
- Using eBPF infrastructure by Alexei Storovoitov

eBPF cluster: ippair

- IP pair load balancing
- Perfect for xbit
- ebpf-lb-file variable in af-packet iface configuration



## eBPF code for ippair

```
static always inline int ipv4 hash(struct sk buff *skb)
    uint32 t nhoff:
    uint32 t src, dst;
    nhoff = skb \rightarrow cb[0];
    src = load word(skb, nhoff + offsetof(struct iphdr, saddr));
    dst = load word(skb, nhoff + offsetof(struct iphdr, daddr));
    return src + dst;
int __section("loadbalancer") lb(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
    u32 nhoff = BPF LL OFF + ETH HLEN;
    skb \rightarrow cb[0] = nhoff;
    switch (skb->protocol) {
        case constant htons(ETH P IP):
            return ipv4 hash(skb):
        case constant htons(ETH P IPV6):
            return ipv6 hash(skb):
        default:
            break:
    return skb->protocol; /* hash on proto by default */
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```

## eBPF cluster: prospective

#### Custom tunnelled traffic

- Tunneling protocol not known by kernel and card
  - L2TP
  - GTP: 4G protocol
- Shared by different flows
- Result in poor load balancing

#### eBPF solution

- Strip tunnel headers
- Load balance on inner packets
- Get fair balancing

SIM



#### AF\_PACKET bypass via eBPF

#### 3 XDP



## The big flow problem: load balancing





## The big flow problem: load balancing





## The big flow problem: load balancing





## The big flow problem: unfair balancing





## The big flow problem: unfair balancing





## The big flow problem: elephant flow





## The big flow problem: elephant flow





## The big flow problem: elephant flow





## The big flow problem

#### Ring buffer overrun

- Limited sized ring buffer
- Overrun cause packets loss
- that cause streaming malfunction

#### Ring size increase

- Work around
- Use memory
- Fail for non burst
  - Dequeue at N
  - Queue at speed N+M

JINT

Stop packet handling as soon as possible

- Tag flow as bypassed
- Maintain table of bypassed flows
- Discard packet if part of a bypassed flow

#### Bypass method

- Local bypass: Suricata discard packet after decoding
- Capture bypass: capture method maintain flow table and discard packets of bypassed flows



## Bypassing big flow: local bypass



**S**T**A**M**V**S

## Bypassing big flow: capture bypass





## Bypassing big flow: capture bypass





#### Attacks characteristic

- In most cases attack is done at start of TCP session
- Generation of requests prior to attack is not common
- Multiple requests are often not even possible on same TCP session

#### Stream reassembly depth

- Reassembly is done till stream.reassembly.depth bytes.
- Stream is not analyzed once limit is reached

#### Activating stream depth bypass

• Set stream.bypass to yes in YAML

#### Ignore some traffic

- Ignore intensive traffic like Netflix
- Can be done independently of stream depth
- Can be done using generic or custom signatures



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- Ignore intensive traffic like Netflix
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- Can be done using generic or custom signatures

#### The bypass keyword

- A new bypass signature keyword
- Trigger bypass when signature match
- Example of signature

#### Suricata update

- Add callback function
- Capture method register itself and provide a callback
- Suricata calls callback when it wants to offload



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#### NFQ bypass in Suricata 3.2

- Update capture register function
- Written callback function
  - Set a mark with respect to a mask on packet
  - Mark is set on packet when issuing the verdict



## And now AF\_PACKET

#### What's needed

- Suricata to tell kernel to ignore flows
- Kernel system able to
  - Maintain a list of flow entries
  - Discard packets belonging to flows in the list
  - Update from userspace
- nftables is too late even in ingress



## And now AF\_PACKET

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#### eBPF filter using maps

- eBPF introduce maps
- Different data structures
  - Hash, array, ...
  - Update and fetch from userspace
- Looks good!

## Using libbpf

Library Linux source in tools/lib/bpf directory

- Provide high level function to load eBPF elf file
- Oreate maps for user
- Do the relocation

#### Sample usage

```
struct bpf_object *bpfobj = bpf_object__open(path);
bpf_object__load(bpfobj);
pfd = bpf_program__fd(bpfprog);
/* store the map in our array */
bpf_map__for_each(map, bpfobj) {
    map_array[last].fd = bpf_map__fd(map);
    map_array[last].name = strdup(bpf_map__name(map));
    last++;
```

## Kernel code and exchange structure

```
struct pair {
    uint64 t time;
    uint64 t packets;
    uint64 t bytes:
};
struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") flow_table_v4 = {
    .type = BPF MAP TYPE HASH,
    key size = sizeof(struct flowv4 keys),
    .value_size = sizeof(struct pair),
    .max entries = 32768.
};
value = bpf map lookup elem(&flow table v4, &tuple);
if (value) {
    sync fetch and add(&value->packets. 1):
    sync fetch and add(&value->bytes, skb->len);
    value-->time = bpf ktime get ns():
    return 0:
return -1;
```

- Data is updated with stats
- Getting last flow activity time allow Suricata to handle timeout



#### Userspace code

```
struct flowv4 keys {
   be32 src:
     be32 dst:
    union {
         be32 ports;
          be16 port16[2];
    };
    u32 ip_proto;
};
while (bpf_map__get_next_key(mapfd, &key, &next_key) == 0) {
    bpf map lookup elem(mapfd, &key, &value);
    clock gettime (CLOCK MONOTONIC, & curtime);
    if (curtime->tv sec * 100000000 - value.time > BYPASSED FLOW TIMEOUT) {
        flowstats ->count++:
        flowstats ->packets += value.packets;
        flowstats -> bytes += value.bytes;
        bpf map delete elem(fd, key):
    key = next key;
```

## Test methodology

#### Test setup

- Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 0 @ 2.70GHz
- Intel Corporation 82599ES 10-Gigabit SFI/SFP+
- Live traffic:
  - Around 1Gbps to 2Gbps
  - Real users so not reproducible

#### Tests

- One hour long run
- Different stream depth values
- Collected Suricata statistics counters (JSON export)
- Graphs done via Timelion

(https://www.elastic.co/blog/timelion-timeline)

#### Results: stream bypass at 1mb



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#### Results: stream bypass at 512kb



VS

## A few words on graphics

#### Tests at 1mb

- Mark show some really high rate bypass
- Potentialy a big high speed flow

#### Tests at 512kb

- We have on big flow that kill the bandwidth
- Capture get almost null
- Even number of closed bypassed flows is low



## AF\_PACKET bypass and your CPU is peaceful



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#### raw packet-page inside driver

- Before allocating SKBs
- Inside device drivers RX function
- Operate directly on RX DMA packet-pages
- Run eBPF program at hook point

#### eBPF decision

- XDP\_PASS: pass to normal network stack (can be modified)
- XDP\_DROP: drop packet
- XDP\_TX: bounce trafic
- XDP\_REDIRECT: redirect packet to another interface using port map

## Talks by Jesper Dangaard Brouer

http://people.netfilter.org/hawk/presentations/LLC2017/XDP\_DDoS\_protecting\_LLC2017.pdf https://people.netfilter.org/hawk/presentations/NetConf2017/xdp\_work\_ahead\_NetConf\_April\_ 2017.pdf

## Need modified drivers

- Supported drivers
  - Mellanox: mlx4 + mlx5
  - Netronome: nfp
  - o Cavium/Qlogic: qede
  - virtio-net
  - Broadcom: bnxt\_en
  - Intel: ixgbe, i40e
- Kernel 4.12 introduce generic drivers

#### Performances

Single CPU on Mellanox 40Gbit/s NICs (mlx4)

- 28 Mpps Filter drop all (actually read/touch data)
- 12 Mpps TX-bounce forward (TX bulking)
- 10 Mpps TX-bounce with udp+mac rewrite



#### Convert eBPF code

- No more access to skb
- Direct access to data means parsing

#### From filter socket to device

- Filter is attached to device
- Code to attach needs to be run
- And added to libbpf (?)
- o per CPU structure for flow table



#### Use perf event

- Use perf event system
  - Memory mapped ring buffer
  - Per CPU structure

#### Architecture constraints

- Load balancing per CPU
- Done by the network card
  - Symetrical hash needed
  - CPU pinning



## Implementation

```
int SEC("xdp") xdp hashfilter(struct xdp md *ctx)
    void *data end = (void *)(long)ctx \rightarrow data end;
    void *data = (void *)(long)ctx->data;
    struct ethhdr *eth = data:
    int rc = XDP PASS:
    uint16 t h proto;
    uint64 t nh off;
    nh_off = sizeof(*eth);
    if (data + nh off > data end)
            return rc;
   h proto = eth \rightarrow h proto;
    if (h proto == constant htons(ETH P 8021Q) || h proto == constant htons(ETH P 8021AD)
            struct vlan hdr *vhdr;
            vhdr = data + nh off:
            nh off += sizeof(struct vlan_hdr);
                                                                                                S
            if (data + nh off > data end)
                     return rc;
```

## Conclusion

#### Suricata, eBPF and XDP

- A fresh but interesting method
- Feedback welcome

## More information

- Stamus Networks: https://www.stamus-networks.com/
- Suricata eBPF code:

https://github.com/regit/suricata/tree/ebpf-3.16

• Libbpf update: https://github.com/regit/linux/tree/libbpf-xdp



**Questions**?

# YOU STIALL NOT



#### avagecatfood.con

#### Thanks to

- Alexei Storovoitov
- Daniel Borkmann

#### Contact me

- Mail: eleblond@stamus-networks.com
- Twitter: @regiteric

#### More information

• Suricata eBPF and XDP code: https://github.com/regit/ suricata/tree/ebpf-3.16

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